Intrahousehold bargaining power in Spain: An empirical test of the collective model

Last Updated: November 4, 2022By

Molina, J. A., Velilla, J., & Ibarra, H. (2022). Intrahousehold bargaining power in Spain: An empirical test of the collective model. Journal of Family and Economic Issues, 1-14.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10834-021-09812-1

 

Resumen:

This paper analyzes the intrahousehold bargaining power of spouses in Spanish families, in a collective framework. We estimate household labor supply equations and, under certain testable restrictions, we obtain a theoretically derived sharing rule for household income, which characterizes intrahousehold bargaining power. Then, using unique data on decision-making in the household, we construct Pareto weights, and study the validity of the collective model by comparing the theoretical sharing rule and the constructed Pareto weight. The results reveal that both the observed Pareto weight and the theoretical sharing rule display qualitative similarities, thus providing direct empirical support to the collective model. Furthermore, the results suggest that Spanish wives behave more altruistically, while husbands behave more egoistically. This should be taken into account by policy makers and researchers when analyzing inequality in the household, and contemplating specific policies affecting the household.

 

 

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